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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court's 
ruling which granted Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied Deland's Motion for Summary Judgment and Deland's 
Motion for a New Trial. The Supreme Court had original 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann., but 
poured it over to this court under Rule 42 Utah R. App. P. This 
court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j), Utah 
Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
POINT I 
Uintah County agrees with Deland's statement that one of the 
issues for review is the interpretation of Section 63-30a-2 Utah 
Code Annotated, and whether or not legal fees should be allowed 
under that statute when a government employee pleads guilty to 
three misdemeanor counts, and three felony counts are dismissed 
on motion of the employee, in a multi-count information. 
The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law, and is thus reviewed for correctness and 
accorded no particular deference. State v Strader, 902 P.2d 638 
(Ct. App. 1995). See also, State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 
1 
1996) . 
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). An appeal from 
a summary judgment is to resolve only legal issues and the 
appellate court does not defer to the trial courtfs conclusions 
of law but reviews them for correctness. Perrine v. Kennecott 
Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996). 
POINT II 
The issue of whether Meacham acted during the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of his employment or under color of 
his authority as required by Section 63-30a-2 when he falsified 
his time sheets was not reached by the trial court, but was 
raised by Uintah County. (R. 182-186) This issue only comes into 
play if this court decides against Uintah County on Point I. 
This court could decide as a matter of law that Meacham1s conduct 
fell outside the scope of his employment or if it doesnTt so 
decide it should remand the matter to the trial judge for a 
factual determination. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1989). 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
This appeal involves the interpretation of Section 63-30a-2 
U.C.A. which states as follows: 
Indictment or information against officer or employee -
Reimbursement of attorneys1 fees and court costs incurred in 
defense. 
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed 
against an officer or employee, in connection with or 
arising out of any act or omission of that officer or 
employee during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment or under color of his authority, and 
that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or 
results in a judgment of acquittal, unless the indictment or 
information is quashed or dismissed upon application or 
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee 
shall be entitled to recover from the public entity 
reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs necessarily 
incurred in the defense of that indictment or information. 
Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is set 
forth below: 
Charged multiple offenses - To be filed in single court. 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, 
citations, or information charging multiple offenses, which 
may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or 
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal 
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense 
with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses 
charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or 
information may not be separated except by order of the 
court and for good cause shown. 
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76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined - Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify 
the effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of 
offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode - Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single 
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished 
in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision 
bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under 
a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate 
trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the 
first information or indictment. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution 
for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of 
the same criminal episode is barred if; 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-
1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
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(b) The former prosecution: 
(I) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment 
for the defendant that has not been reversed, 
set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a. 
fact that must be established to secure 
conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
76-8-402. Misusing public monies. 
This section is set forth in its entirety in Addendum 5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Uintah County agrees with Deland's Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Uintah County does not disagree with any of the facts as 
stated in the Brief of Appellant (except that the criminal 
information was filed November 10, 1993, rather than October 10, 
1993) but believes that this court should consider the following 
additional facts. 
A six count Information was filed against the Uintah County-
Sheriff on November 10, 1993. (R. 75-77 and Addendum 1) Three 
counts (I, II, and III) alleged felony offenses of making profit 
out of or misusing public monies. Three counts (IV, V, and VI) 
5 
alleged misdemeanor offenses of falsification or alteration of 
government records. 
The criminal charges arose from the following factual 
situation. In June, July, and August of 1993, Uintah County and 
the United States Forest Service had a contract whereby officers 
in the Uintah County Sheriff's Department would provide patrols 
on forest service lands on holidays and weekends during the 
officers1 off duty hours. (R. 177-178) The officers were paid by 
the Uintah County Treasurer according to a time sheet submitted 
by the officer. (R. 177) The United States Forest Service would 
then reimburse the county on an annual basis for all payments 
made by the county. (R. 177) 
The basis for the felony and misdemeanor charges stemmed 
from false time sheets submitted by Sheriff Meacham, or at his 
direction, claiming that he patrolled forest lands on dates when 
he did not perform such work, and subsequent payment of public 
monies based on the false time sheets. (R. 175) Three time 
sheets were introduced as evidence at the preliminary hearing in 
support of all six counts. (R. 83 and 175) Each time sheet 
formed the basis for a felony count and a misdemeanor count. (R. 
175) 
The misdemeanor counts were alleged to have occurred June 7, 
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June 21, and July 6, 1993. (R. 75-77) and stemmed from Meacham 
presenting, or causing to be presented, time records requesting 
payment for hours worked on the U.S. Forest Service run, which he 
knew he had not worked as represented on the forms, intending 
that the records be received as genuine. (R. 65-73 and 175) 
The felony counts were alleged to have occurred June 9, June 
23, and July 7, 1993. (R. 75-77) They stemmed from the payments 
Meacham received from the Uintah County Treasurer, after having 
filed the false claims. (R. 175) 
Prior to trial, counsel for Meacham, Loni Deland, filed a 
Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III, the felony counts. (R. 
170-174) Mr. Deland argued in his Memorandum in Support of his 
Motion that "In order to be convicted of a criminal violation of 
Section 76-8-404 the Defendant must be in a fiduciary capacity, 
and due to a conflict of (business) interest, use his position as 
a public official/fiduciary in such a way as to make a profit out 
of his private business dealings vis-a-vis his public office." 
(R. 173) 
On April 11, 1994 Mr. Deland's Motion to Dismiss was argued 
to Judge Hyde and the three felony counts were dismissed. (R. 81) 
Meacham then pled guilty the same day to the three 
misdemeanor counts and the State agreed not to file an amended 
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information seeking additional charges against him. (R. 65-73 and 
81) 
Meacham assigned his claim for legal fees to Deland. (R. 1) 
On July 7, 1994 Deland sent his Notice of Claim for 
$36,616.50 legal fees incurred in his representation of Meacham 
on the felony counts to the Uintah County Attorney. (R. 59-ol) 
Uintah County did not formally deny his claim, but refused to pay 
it. 
The Complaint was filed in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court in Uintah County March 6, 1996. (R. 1-8) 
Deland filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on his Second 
Cause of Action which sought reimbursement pursuant to Section 
63-30a-2 Utah Code Annotated (R. 132-133) and Uintah County filea 
a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability. (R. 
137-138) 
On August 7, 1996 Judge Anderson granted the county's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 198-200) On August 15, 1996 Deland 
filed a Motion for a New Trial (R. 243-244), which was denied 
September 17, 1996. (R. 252-253) Deland's Second and Third 
Causes of Action were dismissed by Stipulation of the parties. 
(R. 254-257) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court was correct when it ruled that the 
information had to be dismissed in its entirety before the Uintah 
County Sheriff was entitled to be reimbursed his legal fees 
pursuant to Section 63-30a-2 Utah Code Annotated. The plain 
language of the statute states that the information must be 
quashed or dismissed or result in a judgment of acquittal. The 
statute does not contain language such as "dismissed in whole or 
in part." Each of the felonies was a single criminal episode 
with one of the misdemeanors, and had to be filed by the state in 
a single information. Even if the state had filed three separate 
informations based on the three separate time sheets, none of the 
informations would have been dismissed in its entirety. 
The legislative history of Section 63-30a-2 Utah Code 
Annotated and of its civil equivalent, Sections 63-30-36 and 63-
30-37 Utah Code Annotated, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
reflect a legislative intent to narrowly define the situations 
when a governmental agency must reimburse an employee for legal 
fees incurred in his defense. 
Case law suggests that the purpose of Section 63-30a-2 Utah 
Code Annotated is to indemnify a "vindicated" employee, which 
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Meacham was not, as he plead guilty to three misdemeanors and was 
punished accordingly. 
POINT II 
This court could rule as a matter of law that Meacham1s 
actions in falsifying his time sheets was not within the scope of 
his employment. Such actions violated the Uintah County 
Personnel Policy and Procedure and also violated the Law 
Enforcement Code of Ethics. If this court doesn't so find, it 
should remand this issue to the trial court for a factual 
determination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION 63-30a-2 U.C.A. 
AND REFUSED TO ALLOW LEGAL FEES BECAUSE THE 
INFORMATION WAS NOT QUASHED OR DISMISSED OR RESULT IN A 
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN ITS ENTIRETY 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 63-30a-2 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
REQUIRES COMPLETE DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION 
All statutory references contained herein are to the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, unless otherwise stated. 
At issue is the interpretation of Section 63-30a-2 which 
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provides as follows: 
"If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed 
against an officer or employee, in connection with or 
arising out of any act or omission of that officer or 
employee during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment or under color of his authority, and 
that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or 
results in a judgment of acquittal, unless the indictment or 
information is quashed or dismissed upon application or 
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee 
shall be entitled to recover from the public entity 
reasonable attorneysTs fees and court costs necessarily 
incurred in the defense of that indictment or information." 
(emphasis added) 
In Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corporation/ 911 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1996) , our Supreme Court summarized the well-
established principles involved in statutory interpretation as 
follows: 
"This Court!s primary responsibility in construing 
legislative enactments is to give effect to the 
Legislature's underlying intent. West Jordan v. Morrison, 
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982)...Generally, the best 
indication of that intent is the statute's plain language. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 
1989). Thus, we will interpret a statute according to its 
plain language, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the 
express purpose of the statute. West Jordan, 656 P.2d at 
446..." 
If the meaning of a statute is plain, the "sole function of 
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." State v. 
Paul, 560 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993) citing Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, Section 46.01 (5th Ed. 1992). 
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Each term in a statue should be interpreted according to its 
usual and commonly accepted meaning. Paul, supra, at 993 citing 
Utah County v. Orem City, 669 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1985). 
There is nothing confusing or inoperable about Section 63-
30a-2. The plain language of the statute requires that the 
information be quashed or dismissed or result in an acquittal 
before a public officer is entitled to recover his legal fees 
incurred in the defense of that information. Had the legislature 
intended the interpretation urged by opposing counsel, it could 
have easily done so by adding language such as "dismissed in 
whole or in part" or "result in an acquittal on all or some of 
the charges." 
Appellant argues that each count in an information should be 
treated as a separate information. Such an interpretation would 
conflict with several of our statutes and rules of procedure 
dealing with the filing of offenses in informations. 
Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that "...informations charging multiple offenses... arising from a 
single criminal episode... shall be filed in a single court...and 
the offenses within the...information may not be separated except 
by order of the court and for good cause shown." 
"Single criminal episode" is defined as all conduct which is 
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closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. Section 76-1-401. 
A defendant has the right not to be subject to separate 
trials for multiple offenses that are part of a single criminal 
episode when these offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court and known to the prosecuting attorney at the time 
the defendant is arraigned. Section 76-1-402. 
A subsequent prosecution would be barred if it arose out of 
a single criminal episode. Section 76-1-403 provides as follows: 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of 
the same criminal episode is barred if; 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-
402(2) in the former prosecution; 
Arguably, each of the three separate time sheets submitted 
by Meacham and the resulting criminal charges could have been 
filed in three separate informations. However, each false time 
sheet formed the basis for a misdemeanor charge of falsifying 
government documents (when it was presented) and a felony charge 
of misuse of public money (when it was paid a day or two later). 
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(R. 83 and 175) Each of the felonies was a single criminal 
episode with one of the misdemeanors and had to be charged in the 
same information. Counts I and IV of the Information were a 
single criminal episode, as were Counts II and V, and Counts III 
and VI. Even though the felony counts were dismissed by Judge 
Hyde, the informations would not have been quashed or dismissed 
as required by Section 63-30a-2 as Meacham pled guilty to three 
misdemeanors. 
This court's analysis could stop with the argument set forth 
above, as the plain language of the statute is not confused or 
ambiguous and requires the information to be dismissed. However, 
a response to opposing counsel1s discussion of the legislative 
history may be useful. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 63-30a-2 AND OF SIMILAR 
STATUTES, SECTIONS 63-30-36 and 63-30-37, DEMONSTRATE A 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO NARROWLY DEFINE THE SITUATIONS WHEN AN 
EMPLOYEE IS REIMBURSED HIS LEGAL FEES 
Section 63-30a-2 was enacted in 1977 as Senate Bill 247. 
Comments made on the floor of the Senate indicate the legislative 
intent was that legal fees were to reimburse an individual who 
was found innocent of the charges. Senator Barlow commented on 
the Senate Floor that..."if charges were brought against us for 
accepting a bribe, it could be absolutely groundless, but we 
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could be indicted and it could be a very costly legal 
expense...to finally prove that we are innocent." (emphasis 
added) (R. 154-156 and Addendum 2) In 1983 House Bill 290 was 
passed to include the word "information", with no comments from 
the floor. 
It is also interesting to note that during the Senate 
hearing on March 7, 1977 Senator Jesk inquired of Senator Barlow, 
the sponsor of the bill, if there were specific people who would 
benefit presently if the bill were to pass. Senator Barlow 
replied that two liquor commissioners who were indicted and 
proven innocent would benefit. (R. 154-156 and Addendum 2) 
Presumably one of those liquor commissioners was Gerald E. 
Hulbert, as it was noted in Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223 
(Utah 1980) that Hulbert..."actively lobbied before the 
legislature to have the statute enacted." (referring to Section 
63-30a-2) Hulbert was a former Chairman of the Liquor Control 
Commission who sued the State to recover his legal fees incurred 
in his successful defense of grand jury indictments issued 
against him for acts allegedly committed in his official capacity 
and pursuant to the then recently enacted Section 63-30a-2. In 
1975, a state grand jury, over a period of several months, issued 
twelve indictments against him. The law firm he retained, 
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represented him over a two and one-half year period, made sixty-
five court appearances, conducted two trials, and made two 
appeals. The court in Hulbert noted that "The result of this 
vigorous defense was the exoneration of plaintiff on all twelve 
indictments." The court also held that the benefits of Section 
63-30a-2 were to be applied retroactively. 
In 1977 at the time the legislature was considering Senate 
Bill 247 and Mr. Hulbert was lobbying for its passage, Mr. 
Hulbertfs situation was much different that Mr. Meacham1s. Mr. 
Hulbert was completely exonerated on all twelve counts after long 
and costly litigation; Mr. Meacham pled guilty to three 
misdemeanor counts and the three felonies were dismissed because 
the district court's interpretation of the felony statute, not 
because of a finding of innocent behavior by Mr. Meacham. 
Sections 60-30-36 and 63-30-37 (Governmental Immunity Act) 
are similar to Section 63-30a-2 in that they provide that a 
governmental entity defend an employee, or reimburse the 
employee for legal fees incurred by the employee in his defense, 
in civil actions brought against the employee for actions taken 
by the employee during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority. The 
governmental entity also is required to pay any judgment entered 
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against the employee or settlement of the claim. In 1987 
Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37 were amended by House Bill No. 15. 
(R. 98-100 and Addendum 3) The changes reflect a legislative 
intent to tighten the circumstances under which the government 
agency must defend or pay for judgments entered against its 
employees in civil suits. (R. 94-97 and Addendum 4) Language 
was added to Section 60-30-36 and 60-30-37 which allowed a 
governmental entity to decline to defend an employee or pay for 
any judgment if the entity determines that the act in question 
did not occur during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of his employment, or under color of authority; 
or that the injury resulted from fraud or malice of the employee; 
or that the injury resulted from the employee being under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol. See Interim Study Committee 
Reference Bulletin. (R. 94-97 and Addendum 4). 
It would be unfair to allow Meacham reimbursement of his 
defense fees when he pled guilty to criminal acts involving 
fraud, when another county employee sued civilly because of 
fraudulent conduct, would not be allowed a defense at government 
expense. The legislative changes in 1987 further limiting the 
situations when a governmental entity is required to defend an 
employee, support the narrow interpretation the trial judge made 
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of Section 63-30a-2 as requiring a complete acquittal of all 
charges before an employee is entitled to be reimbursed his legal 
fees. 
C. ONLY A "VINDICATED" EMPLOYEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED HIS LEGAL 
FEES 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996) provides us 
with the Utah Supreme Courtfs opinion as to the purpose of 
Section 63-30a-2 U.C.A. In Salmon, a Deputy Sheriff was charged 
with two Class B Misdemeanors of assault that arose out of 
actions taken by him in the course of his employment. Separate 
trials were held on each count and two separate juries found him 
not guilty. The issue in Salmon was the amount the deputy 
sheriff should be reimbursed for legal fees, as the County 
stipulated that he was entitled to reimbursement. Justice 
Zimmerman, in concurring that Salmon should be entitled to 
attorney1s fees incurred in litigating his right to attorney's 
fees, wrote that "I agree that lack of such an award would 
undermine the purpose of Section 63-30a-2, which is to indemnify 
a vindicated employee." (emphasis added) 
"Vindicate" is defined as, "to clear of accusation, censure, 
suspicion, etc." WebsterT s Dictionary, (Pamco Publishing Comp. 
1992). Meacham was not vindicated of the criminal charges 
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because the information was not dismissed in its entirety. Based 
on his guilty plea to three Class B Misdemeanors, he was 
sentenced to serve thirty days jail which was suspended; was 
placed on court probation for one year; and was ordered to pay a 
fine of $1,387.50 and restitution of $450.00. (R. 68-74 and 81) 
POINT II 
WHEN HE FALSIFIED HIS TIME SHEETS MEACHAM DID NOT ACT DURING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
OR UNDER COLOR OF HIS AUTHORITY 
The issue of whether or not Meacham acted during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or 
under color of his authority was raised by Uintah County in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 182-186 Memorandum in Opposition 
to PlaintiffTs Motion for Summary Judgment... and In Support of 
Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment) but was never 
reached by the trial court. (R. 198-200) This issue is 
generally a factual question to be determined by the trier of 
fact, unless it is so clearly outside the scope of employment 
that this court can decide it as a matter of law. Birkner v. 
Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). This court need 
only deal with the issue if it decides against Uintah County on 
Point I discussed above. If this court does not rule that 
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MeachairTs conduct in falsifying time sheets, as a matter of law, 
was outside his scope of employment, then it should remand the 
matter to the trial court for a factual determination. 
Meacham was originally charged with three felony counts in 
violation of Section 76-8-402 - misusing public monies. The 
information followed the language of the charging statute and 
alleged that "...Meacham, while Sheriff of Uintah County, a 
public officer, knowingly... committed the crimes of misuse of 
public money." 
This statute however, can be distinguished from Section 63-
30a-2, under which Meacham now seeks reimbursement. In Section 
76-8-402 the focus is on the public monies and imposes criminal 
sanctions for any public officer who misappropriates the public 
monies for his own use. Persons other than public officers, if 
they receive, safekeep, or disburse public monies and fail to 
deal with the monies lawfully, are also guilty of a third degree 
felony. (Section 76-8-403) There is no language or requirement 
that the public officer act during the performance of his duties, 
or within the scope of his employment, or under color of his 
authority when he appropriates the public monies for his own use. 
In fact, for the reasons stated below, such acts would not be 
considered within the scope of his employment. Section 63-30a-2 
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on the other hand, specifically requires that attorney's fees are 
only reimbursable if the information or indictment is "filed in 
connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that 
officer or employee during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of his employment or under color of his authority and 
the information or indictment is dismissed or results in a 
judgment of acquittal." Thus, under Section 76-8-402, one need 
only be a public officer who misappropriates public money or 
under Section 76-8-403 any person who receives, safekeeps, or 
disburses public monies unlawfully to be guilty of the crimes, 
whereas, before being entitled to be reimbursed legal fees, a 
public officer must have acted during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color of his 
authority. 
In Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) it 
was held that a therapist employed by the County Mental Health 
Facility who engaged in sexual misconduct with a patient, was not 
entitled to indemnification by the County because the act did not 
occur during the performance of his duties or within the scope of 
his employment, as required by the statute in effect at the time. 
In determining scope of employment, the court in Birkner 
discussed three criteria that Utah cases have tended to focus on: 
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(1) The employee's conduct must be of the general kind the 
employee is employed to perform. The employee must be about 
the employer's business and the duties assigned by the 
employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a personal 
endeavor. 
(2) The employee's conduct must occur within the hours of 
the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of 
the employment. 
(3) The employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in 
part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. 
In Birkner the court held, as a matter of law, that the 
sexual misconduct was outside the scope of employment. 
Meacham's actions should be analyzed using the Birkner 
criteria: 
(1) The employee's conduct must be of the general kind the 
employee is employed to perform. The employee must be about the 
employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer, as 
opposed to being wholly involved in a personal endeavor. 
Although Meacham was performing the duties of a peace 
officer when he patrolled the forest service land, he did so for 
his own benefit and was ultimately reimbursed for the hours he 
performed by the U.S. Forest Service. This not a situation where 
Meacham used excessive force or arrested someone maliciously 
while acting as a peace officer of Uintah County although being 
paid by the Forest Service. In such a situation, the Court may 
well find that his actions were within the scope of his 
employment or under color of authority as a Uintah County 
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employee even though he was earning extra money working for the 
Forest Service. 
(2) The employee's conduct must occur within the hours of 
the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the 
employment. 
Meacham was to perform the services for the forest Service 
on the weekends and holidays when he was not performing his 
regular duties as Sheriff of Uintah County. (R. 177-178) He was 
to patrol Forest Service land. 
(3) The employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in 
part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. 
Meacham's actions in falsify his time sheets, in no way 
benefited Uintah County and was contrary to the County Policy 
(see Uintah County Personnel Policies and Procedures Sections 
610, which provides that an employee who violates a criminal law 
is subject to discipline, including dismissal. (R. 150-153) His 
actions were also contrary to the standards set for peace 
officers, who are sworn to uphold the laws. (P. 149) haw 
Enforcement Code of Ethics: "I will be exemplary in obeying the 
law..." In analyzing the employee's actions and finding them not 
within the scope of employment, the Court in Birkner found it 
relevant that the employee's actions violated the employee's 
professional duties and violated the rules of the Utah Department 
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of Business Regulation that prohibited a social worker from 
engaging in sexual activities with clients. 
J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992) 
also dealt with the issue of whether a police officer who was 
employed to instruct Explorer Scouts in the area of police work, 
acted within the scope of his employment when he molested a 
scout. The court held that the officer's acts were "a complete 
abandonment of...his employment." Further, such conduct was not 
motivated in any way to benefit the officer's employer. 
Meacham!s conduct in falsifying time sheets that gave rise 
to the criminal charges was not the type of conduct he was to 
perform as the Uintah County Sheriff. Such conduct was a 
personal endeavor and not motivated to serve Uintah County's 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the District Court's ruling that 
granted Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied 
Deland's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for a New Trial. 
Only if this court denies this relief does it need to reach the 
issue of scope of employment. It should rule as a matter of law 
that Meacham's conduct was outside the scope of his employment, 
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or if this court does not make that determination, it should 
remand this issue to the District Court for it to make a factual 
determination of scope of employment. 
DATED this the^QH^ day of March, 1997. 
GAA^ D 
ANN B. STRlNGHflB 
Uintah County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Herschell 
Bullen, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, Stock and Mining 
Exchange Bldg., 39 Exchange Place, Second Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
DATED this the Jty)<!&^ day of March, 1997. 
/TfriuA. (h. Xf^l 
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AFFIDAVIT 
I, Greg Burdett, do solemnly swear that on July 26, 1996,1 
listened to the record of the Senate debate, which occurred on 
March 7, 1077, tot Senate IMII ?A '', and I iMvue iiie attached 
transcription while listening to that record. Moreover; the attached 
transcript of the Senate's debate for Seriate Bill ,:4 / is an accurate 
transcription of that debate which occurred on March 7, 1977. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 1996. 
Zl 
Greg Bu^dt 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Utah ) 
The foregoing affidavit was acknowledged before me this 
26th d^pf July, 1996, by Greg Burdett. 
(i 
*£S25N SANDRA W. DIXON 
t/£^i% MUM PU8UC- STATE of UTAH 
! * ( * § £ £ ]'*\ CEN™RY TilTlE COMPANY 
A w § 5 > # / 2 9 G EAST 930 SOUTH 
' v V l : . , ' V OREM, UTAH 84058 
"---—''' COMM. EXP. 2-11-CG 
Senate Bill 24 7, Reii nbi irsemei it of OfFicei s ai id Ei nplo> ees, sponsored by Senators Bowen and 
Barlow 
This bill provides for the leimbursement to officers and employees of the state for 
legal fees and costs necessarily incur red in the successfiil defense of grand jury 
indictments. 
March?, 1977, Senate Floor. 
Senator Barlow: 
Senator J esk: 
Senator Barlow: 
Senator J esk: 
Senator Barlow: 
Unknown Senator: 
Mr. President, Senate Bill 247 relates to the providing for the 
reimbursement to officers and employees for legal fees and costs 
incurred in the special defense of a grand jury indictment. Of 
course, what this means is if they are found innocent and in 
defending themselves against charges which were not proven, it 
would simply reimburse them for reasonable attorney fees, for these 
charges, or for the indictment. And, I just think this could really 
happen to any one of us, after all we are consider officers of the 
state as legislators, if charges were brought against us for accepting 
a bribe, it could be absolutely groundless, but we could be indicted 
and it could be a very costly legal expense, unless we happen to be 
an attorney ourselves, even then your time is valuable, but for most 
of us it would be a very costly legal expense to finally prove that we 
are innocent. I think that it is absolute right and proper, so I hope 
you will support us in this bill. 
Would Senator Barlow yield to a question17 
Yes. I'll try to. 
Are there specific people who would benefit presently if this bill 
would pass and if so would you name them? 
Yes,, I would think the two commissioners who were involved in 
the — the liquor commissioners who were indicted and proven 
innocent, they would be beneficiaries of this bill. There might be 
some others, but they are the only two I'm aware of. 
Senator Barlow, my I ask a question Mr. President? Now in 
answer to Senator Jesk's question, I what was the answer again. 
Senator Barlow: The answer was . 
mentioned them. 
I 
1 
Unknown Senator: And that is what! -:i r • - -, • . ••£/ 
Senator Barlow: Yes, that is correct. 
Senate President: Thei e is a qi i : i i n i i presei it Do 11 leai a sii igle dissenting \ otel ' 
Unknown Senator: No. 
Senate President: I hear one, we will have a roll call vote on Senate bill 247, 
Roll Call Vote Conducted. 
Senate President: Senate bill 247 has received twenty four (24) aye votes, four (4) no 
votes, and one (1) not being present has been passed by the Senate 
and will be sent to the House for further action. 
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(7) Any federal or state aeenc) . board, or com-
mission, ^peaaj district, or municipal corporation 
that makes ^ survey o\ lands within this sjate_shal_l 
comply with this section. 
Section 9. Section Enacted. 
Section P-23-1S. Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is enacted to read: 
17-23-18. Survey maps and narratives 
Amendments. 
(1) Any survey map or narrative_ filed and reco-
rded under the provisions o( this chapter may be 
amended by an affidavit of corrections: 
[*) to show any courses or distances omitted from 
the map or narrative; 
(b) to correct an error in the description of the 
real property shown on the map or narrative: or 
(c) to correct _any other errors or omissions where 
the error or omission is ascertainable from the data 
shown on the map or narrative as recorded. 
(2) (a) The affidavit of correction shall be prep-
ared by the registered professional land surveyor 
who filed the map or narrative. 
(b) In the event of the death, disability, or retir-
ement from practice of the surveyor who filed the 
map or narrative, the county surveyor may prepare 
the affidavit of correction. 
(c) The affidavit shall set forth in detail the corr-
ections made. 
(d) The seal and signature of the registered prof-
essional land surveyor filing the affidavit of corre-
ction shall be affixed to the affidavit. 
(3) The county surveyor having jurisdiction of the 
map or narrative shall cenify that the affidavit of 
correction has been examined and that the changes 
shown on the map or narrative are changes permi-
tted under this section. 
(4) Nothing in this section permits changes in 
courses or distances for the purpose of redesigning 
parcel configurations. 
Section 10. Sections Repealed. 
Section 17-23-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1961, 
Section 17-23-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1961, 
Section 17-23-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah 1979, 
and Section 17-23-11, Utah Code Anno ta t ed 
1953, are repealed. 
C! 1APTER 30 
H. B. No. 15 
Passed January 30. ^ ' 
Approved March 10. x>' 
Effective July I. W>' 
CLARIFICA 1 ION OK PI HI V : 
EMPLOYEES I N D E M N U K ' VMON 
};:• i "nl B. Wilson 
AN v I KrI.Aii.NG TO SI Vlt KKKA1RS IN 
G E M R A i . CLARIFYING CIK\ I MSTANCES 
IN WHICH A GOVERNMKNVVl ENTITY 
MUST REPRESENT, OR MA\ REFUSE TO 
R E P R E S E N T , A PUBLH EMPLOYEE 
AGAINST A CIVIL CLAIM. CLARIFYING 
PAYMENT OF FEES AND COSYS INCURRED 
BY EMPLOYEE IN DEFENSF OK CRIMINAL 
CHARGE; AND PROVIDING VN EFFECTIVE 
DATE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTION OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS RX IOWS: 
AMENDS: 
63-30-36, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 131, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
63-30-37, AS ENACTED BY ^ HAPTER 131, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
63-30A-3, AS LAST AMENDE: Sx. < \ IA PTER 
194, LAWS OF UTAH 1986 
Be it enacted by the Legislature i\*' *^ ^ : " °t Vtah: 
Section. 1. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-36, Utah Code vt=outed 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 131, Laws - ' ^ ^ ^ 8 3 , is 
amended to read: 
63-30-36. Defending government <***>>** * 
Request - Cooperation - Pay m e * * judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Sub^ccvca P and (3), 
a governmental entity shall ck**^. An>" a c l i ° n 
brought against its employee a n ^ \ c s an act or 
omission occurring: 
(a) during the performance ^ * employee's 
duties; 
(b) within the scope of the c -v^ee /> employ-
ment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
[WJ (2) (a) Before a g o v e r r . ^ - i entity may 
defend its employee against a c&-~- -*-" employee 
[must] shall make a written r e c * ^ -x "•"* govern-
mental entity to defend him [aft^-PH*-*****""]; 
(i) within ten days after ser\ ici : : :A:*SS upon 
him; or 
T>d 
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(ii) within [such] a longer period [as] t_hau would 
not prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining 
a defense on his behalf[,]; or 
(iii) within a period that^  would not conflict with 
notice requirements imposed on the entity in conn-
ection with insurance carried by the entity relating 
to the risk involved. 
(_b) If the employee fails to make a request, or 
fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the 
governmental entity [«] need not [required to] 
defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay 
any judgment, compromise, or settlement against 
the employee in respect to the claim. 
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend 
an action against an employee if it determines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not 
occur: 
(i) during the performance of the employee's 
duties; or 
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or 
(iii) under color of authority; or 
(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the 
fraud or malice of the employee; or 
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim 
was based resulted from: 
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or 
greater by weight than the established legal limit; or 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable 
of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that rendered the person 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally 
impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform 
his job function because of the use of alcohol, 
because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-4, or 
because of the combined influence of alcohol and a 
nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by 
Section 58-37-4. 
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written 
request to defend an employee, the governmental 
entity shall inform the employee whether or not it 
shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide 
a defense, the basis for its refusal. 
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense 
shall not be admissible for any purpose in the action 
in which the employee is a defendant. 
[(2)] (5) If a governmental entity conducts the 
defense of an employee, the governmental entity 
shall pay any judgment based upon the claim, or 
any compromise or settlement of the claim, except 
as provided in Subsection [(3)] (6). 
[f3)] (6) A governmental entity may conduct the 
defense of an employee under an agreement with the 
employee that the [government] governmental entity 
reserves the right not to pay [the] a judgment, 
that the claim arose out of an act or omission occ-
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tfffiftg-diifmt-^he-^effofffl^fK^e^-his duties, within 
the--5^ope—of-his- ^mpk>yfflem,--or under-color of 
autbofHyj if the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) 
are established. 
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-
1L a_fft-Pii the__qbljgation qf_a governmental entity to 
provide insurance coverage according to the~requTr-
ements of Subsection 41-12a-301 (3) and Section 
63-30-29.5. 
(b) A governmental entity may refuse to defend 
an action against its employee under the conditions 
set forth in Subsection (3), but shall still provide 
coverage up to the amount specified in Sections 31 A-
22-304 and 63-30-29.5. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 131, Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense 
costs by government employee. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays 
a judgment entered against him, or any portion of 
it, which the governmental entity is required to pay 
L under Section 63-30-36, the employee [is entitled 
to] may recover from the governmental entity the 
amount of [s&eb] the payment and the reasonable 
costs incurred in his defense [from the governme 
ntal entity]. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the 
defense of an employee against a claim, or [dees 
conduct] conducts the defense under an agreement as 
provided in Subsection 63-30-36 (f3)] (6), the 
employee may recover from the governmental entity 
under Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omis-
sion upon which the judgment is based occurred 
during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment, or under color of autho-
rity, and that he conducted the defense in good 
faith; and 
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that 
the injury or damage resulted fronK 
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee; 
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or 
greater by weight than the established legal limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable 
of safely driving the vehicle; 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that rendered the person 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally 
impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform 
his job function because of the use of alcohol, 
because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-4, or 
because of the combined use of alcohol and a non-
prescribed controlled substance as defined in Section 
58-37-4. 
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Section 3. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 194, Laws of Utah 
1986, is amended to read: 
63-30a-3. Request for defense or reimbursement. 
(JJ A request [fef~a-<iefeflse of a criminal charge 
ef-4ftdictmem tt4] for reimbursement of attorneys' 
fees and court costs shall be filed in the manner 
provided in Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37. 
(2) (a) Any reimbursement of attorneys' fees and 
court costs filed on behalf of an officer or employee 
of the state shall be paid from funds appropriated 
to the department or division that employed the 
officer or employee at the time of the act or omis-
sion that gave rise to the indictment or information. 
(b) If those funds are unavailable, the reimburs-
ement shall be paid from the General Fund upon 
approval by the Board of Examiners and legislative 
appropriation. 
Section 4. Effective Date. 
This act takes effect on July 1, 1987. 
CHAPTER 31 
H. B. No. 18 
Passed February 2, 1987 
Approved March 10, 1987 
Effective April 27, 1987 
LICENSE PLATES OF LEASED STATE 
VEHICLES 
By Stephen^!. Bodily 
AN ACT RELATING TO IDENTIFICATION OF 
GOVERNMENT VEHICLES; REQUIRING 
THAT GOVERNMENT VEHICLES BE IDEN-
TIFIED WITH AN IDENTIFICATION MARK 
AND AN "EX' PLATE; MAKING EXCEPT-
IONS TO THE IDENTIFICATION REQUIRE-
MENT; AND MAKING TECHNICAL CORR-
ECTIONS. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
41-1-44.1, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
30, LAWS OF UTAH 1985 
41-7-1.5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 70, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1963 
REPEALS: 
41-7-1, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
32, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 41-1-44.1. Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
as last amended b> Chapter 30, Laws of Utah 1985, 
is amended to read: 
41-1-44.1. Plates issued to political subdivisions 
or state - When letters "E\" are to be displayed 
- Exceptions. 
(1) Every [regi^fajien-plate issued to-aftyj town, 
city, board of education, [ef-efhef] school district, 
state [institutions! institution of learning, county", 
[of] other governmental department, [in the state; 
ef-fe] subdivision, or district, and the state [itself 
(a) place a registration plate displaying [have 
displayed upon it] the letters, "EX[7]" [except as 
provided in Subsections (2) and (3).] on every vehicle 
owned and operated by them or leased for their 
exclusive use; and 
(b) display an identification mark designating the 
vehicle as the property of the entity in a conspicuous 
place on both sides of the vehicle. 
(2) The [provisions contained in this section do 
not include motor vehicles in the service of the 
governor of the state, the attorney general, or any 
federal, state, or local governmental departments 
engaged in investigative work where secrecy is nec-
essary] entity need not display the *EX" registration 
plate or the identification mark required by Subse-
ction (1) if: 
(a) the motor vehicle is in the direct service of the 
governor or lieutenant governor of Utah or the att-
orney general, state auditor, or state treasurer of 
Utah; 
(b) the motor vehicle is used in official investiga-
tive work where secrecy is essential; 
(c) the motor vehicle is provided to an official of 
the entity as part of a compensation package allo-
wing unlimited personal use of that vehicle; or 
(d) the personal security of the occupants of the 
vehicle would be jeopardized if the "EX" registra-
tion plate were in place. 
(3) Plates issued to Utah Highway Patrol vehicles 
may bear the capital letters "UHP," a beehive logo, 
and the call number of the vehicle for which the 
plate is issued. 
(4) The State Tax Commission [is responsible for 
the issuance of] shall issue "EX" and "UHP" plates, 
and shall [promulgate necessary] enact rules [te 
carry out this duty] establishing the procedure for 
application and distribution for the plates. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 41-7-1.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 70, Laws of Utah 1963, is 
amended to read: 
41-7-1.5. Marking of state-owned vehicles for 
departments, colleges and universities - Duties of 
department of finance - Exceptions. 
(1) (a) Ail [state owned and—operated] motor 
vehicles owned, leased for use, or operated by the 
state shall [be marked as provided in this section] 
display an identification mark and "EX" plates as 
required by Section 41-1-44.1. 
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Date October 9, 1986 SESSION. 
H. B. NO. 15 Title CLARIFICATION OF PUBLIC EMPI,OYE$S INDEMNIFICATION 
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Joint Rule 23.16 requires the Legislative General Counsel or his designee to review and approve all legislation and, 
with the approval of the sponsor, to make those changes necessary to: (a) insure that it is in proper legal formi (b) 
remove any ambiguities; and (c) avoid constitutional or statutory conflicts. 
The Legislative General Counsel or his designee has reviewed and approved this legislation. The following 
information outlines the considerations on whicl* the approval was given. .'•'...: 
-tf • 
yes no 
an 
yes no 
• 
no 
conflicts 
possible 
conflicts 
1. The bill contains a "single subject" which is clearly expressed In the 
title as required by the Utah Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 22. 
2. The bill meets all the form requirements prescribed by legislative rule. 
3. The bill does not have state or federal constitutional conflicts. 
(Judgments regarding constitutionality address only obvious constitutional 
problems and do not represent a detailed review of all issues.} 
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Interim Study Committee R 
eference Bulletin Report 
for the 1987 General Sess 
ion 
Interim Study Committee 
Reference Bulletin 
Report for the 1987 General Session 
This bulletin provides a brief summary of studies and recommendations 
requiring action at the 1987 General Session. 
Included in each study report are the following: 
• A summary of background information. 
• A statement of committee action. 
• A summary of proposed legislation. 
• A list of available reference sources. 
Reference Bulletin Number 8, January 1987 
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TORT REFORM/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
I. Background Information 
In the past several years, lawsuits naming governmental entities as defendants 
have increased dramatically. The large damage awards against governmental entities 
that plaintiffs have obtained in these lawsuits has made it increasingly difficult for 
government entities to obtain or afford liability insurance. 
A task force coordinated by the League of Cities and Towns proposed three bills 
that would make it more difficult to obtain a damage award against a government 
entity. 
I. Committee Action 
At its September and October meetings, the committee heard from and 
reviewed draft legislation from the Governmental Immunity Task Force. 
The committee made the following recommendations: 
a. Antitrust Amendments - The committee recommended a proposal to 
prohibit recovery of damages, attorney's fees, or costs against a political 
subdivision or its representatives, or from anyone who acted at the 
direction of the representatives of a political subdivision. 
b. Clarification of Public Employees Indemnification - The committee 
recommended a proposal to allow the government entity to refuse to pay 
an employee's legal fees if the employee was acting without authority, 
outside his job responsibilities, or if the employee intentionally lied or 
cheated in performing the act. The committee also recommended that the 
government entity be allowed to refuse to defend an employee who caused 
someone harm because the employee was under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs. 
c. Governmental Immunity Act Amendments - The committee agreed to the 
recommendation that the Legislature define everything performed by 
government as a "governmental function." As so defined, a government 
entity could be sued only for those acts which the Legislature had 
specifically allowed them to be sued for. 
III. Proposed Legislation 
The interim committee has endorsed the following legislation for the 1987 
General Session: 
House Bill 17, "Amendments to Utah Antitrust Act," limits a plaintiffs ability 
to recover damages or fees when filing a complaint against a government entity. 
<*< 
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House Bill 15, "Clarification of Public Employees Indemnification," outlines 
public employees1 activities that may cause forfeiture of their rights for government 
defense. 
House Bill 16, "Governmental Immunity Act Amendments," defines 
"governmental function," and "discretionary function" for purposes of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
IV. Reference Sources 
Fellows, John L., Governmental Immunity Memorandum. Salt Lake City: 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, September 4, 
1986. 
State and Local Affairs Interim Committee. Minutes of meetings of August 
20 and September 17, 1986. 
For additional information in this area, contact Dotti A. Mortensen, Research 
Analyst, or John L. Fellows, Associate General Counsel, Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel. 
* * * 
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457 OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT 76-8-402 
(n) medicine other than medicine pro-
vided by the facility's health care providers in 
compliance with facility policy, cr 
(in) poison in any quantit) 
id) Any person is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor who without the permission of the au-
thority operating the correctional or mental 
health facility fails to declare or knowingly pos-
sesses at a correctional facility or in a secure area 
of a mental health facility any 
(1) spirituous or fermented liquor, 
(n) medicine, or 
(in) poison in any quantity 
(6) The possession distribution or use of a con-
trolled substance at a correctional facility or in a 
secure area of a mental health facility shall be pros-
ecuted in accordance with Title 58 Chapter 37, Utah 
Controlled Substances Act 1996 
76-8-312. Bai l - jumping. 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense when having 
been released on bail or on his own recognizance by 
court order or by other lawful authority upon condi-
tion that he subseauently appear personally upon a 
charge of an offense he fails without jus t cause to 
appear at the time and place which have been lawfully 
designated for his appearance 
(2) An offense under this section is a felony of the 
third degree when the offense charged is a felony, a 
class B misdemeanor when the offense charged is a 
misdemeanor and an infraction when the offense 
charged is an infraction 1974 
76-8-313. Threatening elected officials — Com-
mission of assault. 
A person commits assault on an elected official 
when he attempts or threatens, irrespective of a 
showing of immediate force or violence, to inflict 
bodily injury to the elected official with the intent to 
impede, intimidate, or interfere with the elected offi-
cial in the performance of his official duties or with the 
intent to retaliate against the elected official because 
of the performance of his official duties 1996 
76-8-314. Threatening elected officials — 
"Elected official* defined. 
As used in this section, "elected official" means 
(1) any elected official of the state, county, or 
city and includes the members of the official's 
immediate family 
(2) any temporary judge appointed to fill a 
vacant judicial position, 
(3) any judge not yet retained by a retention 
election, 
(4) any member of a school board, and 
(5) any person appointed to fill a vacant posi-
tion of an elected official as defined in Subsection 
(1) 1996 
76-8-315. Threatening elected officials — Pen-
alties for assault. 
Assault on an elected official is a felony of the third 
degree if bodily injury is attempted or occurs, other-
wise the assault is a class B misdemeanor 1983 
76-8-316. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating 
against a judge or member of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the 
person threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder a 
judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole 
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere 
with the judge or member of the board while engaged 
m the performance of the judge's or member's official 
duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge 
or member on account of the performance of those 
official duties 
(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the 
person commits an assault on a judge or a member of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole with the intent to 
impede intimidate or interfere with the judge or 
member of the board while engaged m the perfor-
mance of the judge's or member's official duties, or 
with the intent to retaliate against the judge or 
member on account of the performance of those official 
duties 
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the 
person commits aggravated assault or attempted 
murder on a judge or a member of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole with the purpose to impede, 
intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of 
the board while engaged in the performance of the 
judge s or member's official duties or with the purpose 
to retaliate against the judge or member on account of 
the performance of those official duties 
(4) As used in this section 
(a) "Immediate family" means parents, spouse, 
surviving spouse, children, and siblings of the 
officer 
(b) "Judge" means judges of all courts of record 
and courts not of record 
(c) "Judge or member" includes the members of 
the judge's or member's immediate family 
(d) "Member of the Board of Pardons and Pa-
role" means appointed members of the board 
(5) A member of the Board of Pardons and Parole is 
an executive officer for purposes of Subsections 76-5-
20200 1995 
PART 4 
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PROPERTY 
76-8-401. "Public monies" and "public officer* 
defined. 
As used m this title 
(1) "Public monies" means "public funds" as 
defined m Section 51-7-3 
(2) "Public officer" means 
(a) all elected officials of the state, a politi-
cal subdivision of the state, a county, town, 
city, precinct, or district, 
(b) a person appointed to or serving an 
unexpired term of an elected office, 
(c) a judge of a court of record and not of 
record including justice court judges, and 
(d) a member of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole 1995 
76-8-402. Misus ing publ ic mon ie s . 
(1) Every officer of this state or a political subdivi-
sion, or of any county, city, town, precinct, or district of 
this state, and every other person charged with the 
receipt, safekeepmg, transfer or disbursement of pub-
lic monies commits an offense if the officer or other 
charged person 
(a) appropriates the money or any portion of it 
to his own use or to the use of another without 
authority of law, 
(b) loans the money or any portion of it without 
authonty of law, 
(c) fails to keep the money m his possession 
until disbursed or paid out by authonty of law, 
(d) unlawfully deposits the money or any por-
tion in any bank or with any other person, 
(e) knowingly keeps any false account or 
makes any false entry or erasure m any account 
of or relating to the money, 
76-8-403 CRIMINAL AND TRAFFIC CODE 458 
(f) fraudulently alters, falsifies, conceals, de-
stroys, or obliterates any such account; 
(g) willfully refuses or omits to pay over, on 
demand, any public monies in his hands, upon the 
presentation of a draft, order, or warrant drawn 
upon such monies by competent authority; 
(h) willfully omits to transfer the money when 
the transfer is required by law; or 
(i) willfully omits or refuses to pay over, to any 
officer or person authorized by law to receive it, 
any money received by him under any duty im-
posed by law so to pay over the same. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) is a felony of the 
third degree, except it is a felony of the second degree 
if: 
(a) the value of the money exceeds $5,000; 
(b) the amount of the false account exceeds 
$5,000; 
(c) the amount falsely entered exceeds $5,000; 
(d) the amount that is the difference between 
the original amount and the fraudulently altered 
amount exceeds $5,000; or 
(e) the amount falsely erased, fraudulently 
concealed, destroyed, obliterated, or falsified in 
the account exceeds $5,000. 1995 
76-8-403. Failure to k e e p and pay over public 
monies . 
Every person who receives, safekeeps, transfers, or 
disburses public monies who neglects or fails to keep 
and pay over the money in the manner prescribed by 
law is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 1995 
76-8-404. Making profit out of or m i s u s i n g pub-
lic monies — Disqualif ication from of-
fice. 
A public officer, regardless of whether or not the 
officer receives, safekeeps, transfers, disburses, or has 
a fiduciary relationship with public monies, who shall 
make a profit out of public monies, or shall use the 
same for a purpose not authorized by law, is guilty of 
a felony as provided in Section 76-8-402 and shall, in 
addition to the punishment provided by law, be dis-
qualified to hold public office. 1995 
76-8-405. Failure to pay over fine, forfeiture or 
fee. 
Every public officer who receives any fine, forfei-
ture, or fee and refuses or neglects to pay it over 
within the time prescribed by law is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 1973 
76-8-406. Obstructing col lect ion of revenue . 
Every person who willfully obstructs or hinders any 
public officer from collecting any revenue, taxes, or 
other sums of money in which the people of this state 
are interested, and which such officer is by law em-
powered to collect, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
1973 
76-8-407. Refusing to give tax assessment infor-
mation, or giving false information. 
Every person who unlawfully refuses, upon de-
mand, to give to any county assessor or deputy county 
assessor a list of his property subject to taxation, or to 
swear to such list, or who gives a false name, or 
fraudulently refuses to give his true name when 
demanded by the assessor in the discharge of his 
official duties, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
1973 
76-8-408. Giving false tax receipt or failing to 
give receipt. 
Every person who uses or gives any receipt, except 
tha t prescribed by law, as evidence of the payment for 
any tax or license of any kind, or who receives pay-
ment for the tax or license without delivering the 
receipt prescribed by law, is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. 1973 
76-8-409. Refusing to give tax assessor or tax or 
license collector list of, or denying 
access to, employees. 
Every person who, when requested by the assessor 
or collector of taxes or license fees, refuses to give to 
the assessor or collector the name and residence of 
each person in his employ, or to give the assessor or 
collector access to the building or place of employ-
ment, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1991 
76-8-410. Do ing bus iness without l icense . 
Every person who commences or carries on any 
business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transac-
tion or carrying on of which a license is required by 
any law, or by any county, city, or town ordinance, 
without taking out the license required by law or 
ordinance is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
76-8-411. Trafficking in warrants. 
No state, county, city, town, or district officer shall, 
either directly or indirectly, contract for or purchase 
any warrant or order issued by the state, county, city, 
town, or district of which he is an officer, at any 
discount whatever upon the sum due on the warrant 
or order, and, if any state, county, city, town, or district 
officer shall so contract for or purchase any such order 
or warrant on a discount, he is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 1973 
76-8-412. Stealing, destroying or muti lat ing 
public records by custodian. 
Every officer having the custody of any record, map, 
or book, or of any paper or proceedings of any court, 
filed or deposited in any public office, or placed in his 
hands for any purpose, who is guilty of stealing, 
willfully destroying, mutilating, defacing, altering, 
falsifying, removing, or secreting the whole or any 
part thereof, or who permits any other person so to do, 
is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 1973 
76-8-413. Stealing, destroying or mutilating 
public records by one not custodian. 
Every person, not an officer such as is referred to in 
the preceding section, who is guilty of any of the acts 
specified in tha t section is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor. 1973 
76-8-414. Recording false or forged instru-
ments. 
Every person who knowingly procures or offers any 
false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or 
recorded in any public office, which instrument, if 
genuine, might be filed or registered or recorded 
under any law of this state or of the United States, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 1973 
76-8-415. Damaging or removing monuments of 
official surveys. 
Every person who willfully injures, defaces, or re-
moves any signal, monument, building, or appurte-
nance thereto, placed, erected, or used by persons 
engaged in the United States or state survey is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
76-8-416. Taking toll or maintaining road, 
bridge, or ferry without authority — 
Refusal to pay lawful tolL 
Any person who demands or receives compensation 
for the use of any bridge or ferry, or who sets up or 
keeps any road, bridge, or ferry, or constructed ford, 
